It has been suggested by Bak, Stassinopoulos, Chialvo and others that the brain operates at a critical level. In this letter, we examine a neural network proposed to model this, the simple three-layer version of the Chialvo-Bak 'minibrain' [Neuroscience 90, 1137[Neuroscience 90, (1999], and present numerical results which suggest that it does indeed display critical (scale-free) behaviour (1/f β noise, with β ≈ 1.3) subject to the tuning of a control parameter, η C = η IM /(η IP (η OP − 1)), where η IP , η IM and η OP are, respectively, the sizes of the input, intermediary and output layers of neurons. The cause of this behaviour is identified as interference between active paths in the network, and an heuristic analogy is drawn with Bak, Chen and Tang's forest-fire model.
Introduction
Ever since it was recognized as the seat of human intelligence and learning, the brain, and indeed biological neural systems in general, have been a source of immense fascination and wonder to scientists and non-scientists alike. To ask questions about how the brain works is, after all, to ask fundamental questions about our nature and identity ('What is it that makes us who we are?'), and to this end an immense amount of research has been conducted across a wide variety of fields, from medicine, anatomy and psychology to computer science, physics and mathematics-all to a greater or lesser extent coming under the catch-all title of neuroscience. Yet there is still no general understanding of the fundamental processes at work; we still lack a neural 'Newtonian mechanics', the essential laws and principles that govern the behaviour of neuronal networks.
It has been suggested by Bak, Stassinopoulos, Chialvo and others that one such essential feature is that the brain may operate at a critical level, and a number of particularly elegant neural models have been put forward in the hope of capturing this [1] [2] [3] [4] , all distinguished by being self-organizing systems with extremely simple dynamics yet complex emergent behaviour. Perhaps the most appealing is that created by Chialvo and Bak [3, 4] : recently dubbed the 'minibrain' [5] 1 , it is notable for its use of extremal ('winner-takes-all') dynamics [6] and solely negative feedback to create a fast and highly adaptive learning system.
In this paper, we examine the simple three-layer version of this model and present numerical results which strongly suggest that, subject to tuning of a control parameter, it does indeed exhibit scale-free or critical behaviour, i.e., 1/f β noise, with β ≈ 1.3. Although a complete analytic understanding of this phenomenon is still to be developed, the underlying mechanism is identified as being interference between active paths in the network. A possible link with the so-called forest-fire model [7] is suggested, and we conclude with a few remarks on the importance of criticality in the minibrain network.
The Chialvo-Bak 'minibrain' model
Although a variety of alternative network topologies are possible [3, 4] , the simplest version of the minibrain model consists of three separate layers of neurons (see Figure 1 ): a layer of η IP inputs, a 'hidden' intermediary layer of size η IM , and a layer of η OP output neurons. Each input neuron has a (oneway) synaptic connection to every intermediary neuron, and similarly each intermediary neuron is connected to every output neuron; we will use the terminology
to denote such a network.
Each synaptic connection is assigned a 'strength' value, initially determined Each input neuron has a (one-way) synaptic connection to every intermediary neuron, and each intermediary neuron has a similar connection to every output neuron. Using the shorthand of Equation (1), this network would be denoted by Γ (3, 6, 4) .
randomly: when an input neuron is stimulated, a signal is sent along the single strongest connection leading from it, and the intermediary neuron at the end of that connection then fires. In the same manner, the output neuron that fires is the one at the end of the strongest connection leading from the firing intermediary neuron. This is the extremal dynamics in action: the signal passes along only the strongest channels, thus allowing us to identify an active level of synaptic connections-the strongest connections leading from each neuronthat are collectively responsible for all decisions taken by the system. As we will see later, the active level is an extremely important aspect of the minibrain network.
Once an output has been produced, what next? Chialvo and Bak envision a hardwired 'Darwinian good selector', determined by biological evolution, that decides whether the output produced is a satisfactory response to the input. If it is, no further action is taken. If it is unsatisfactory, however, a negative feedback system is sent to the system, and all the synaptic connections responsible are 'punished' by having their strength decreased by a random amount.
(Biologically, one might imagine that synaptic activity leaves behind a chemical trace marking the synapse as 'used', with the feedback signal being the release of some hormone; a detailed description of the biological inspiration for the model can be found in ref. [3] .) It is important to stress that the system uses only negative feedback: unlike most traditional models, and unlike the traditional conception of biological neuronal dynamics 2 , there is no reward to synapses for making a good decision. The poor unfortunate minibrain learns by the stick, not the carrot-'Spare the rod and spoil the ANN', perhaps?
Learning, adaption and criticality
Arguably the simplest task that one can set such a system is the learning of an input-output map (e.g., 1 → 1, 2 → 2, . . . , n → n): sequentially stimulating each input neuron and, if the output is unsatisfactory, applying negative feedback as described above. Chialvo and Bak showed, although without explicit quantification, that learning time for such a map (defined as the number of times the network has to run through a complete cycle of inputs 2 A number of sources are quoted in ref. [3] to justify the proposition that negative feedback ('long-term depression' or LTD) is the fundamental mechanism for learning in biological neural systems. In addition the reader may wish to consult a number of other works which have emphasized the importance of synaptic pruning in brain activity [8] [9] [10] . before complete success is achieved) decreases with the number η IM of intermediary neurons [3] . However, this quantity cannot really be thought of as a physical quantity within the minibrain network itself, and hence in this letter we will use an alternative (though related) measure of learning efficiency: the total amount, ρ, of negative feedback required-or equivalently, the number of errors made-before we can run through the complete sequence of inputs without any mistakes. Fig. 2 shows that in learning an input-output map of the above type (with η IP = η OP = n), the mean amount, ρ , of negative feedback required scales qualitatively in a similar manner to Chialvo and Bak's learning time: as the number of intermediary neurons η IM increases, ρ decreases towards an eventual minimum whose value appears to depend on n. This behaviour is quantified precisely in Fig. 3 , where we investigate the effects of unequal output mappings where η IP = η OP , e.g., i → i mod η OP : both the minimum value of ρ and the decrease in negative feedback that occurs with increasing η IM collapse when ρ and η IM are normalized with respect to η IP (η OP − 1), and hence we can define a control parameter for learning time,
It can be seen that at η C ≈ 1 a sharp transition occurs in ρ between the minimum mean and truly immense values. Thus, one might expect to find critical behaviour at this point. Fig. 4 suggests that this is indeed the case: if once the minibrain has learned a given mapping, we randomly reassign a new output to one of the inputs, and repeat this process, we find that the negative feedback ρ required to adapt to the new map scales according to a power law, with exponent approximately −1.3, when η C = 1. The system is subcritical for η C > 1, with ρ scaling exponentially, while for η C < 1 huge, supercritical values of ρ are the norm, with N(ρ) initially following the power law but then abruptly switching to a logarithmic (!), rather than exponential, cutoff. Hence η C = 1 represents not just a transition point but a critical point for the learning ability of the minibrain neural network.
To understand what this means physically for the network, we have to recall what the meaning of negative feedback is. Decreasing the strength of a synaptic connection almost certainly removes it from the active level of synapses (see Section 2); another connection replaces it. A large amount of negative feedback therefore implies a large change in the topology of the active level of the network-an 'avalanche' in the network landscape, so to speak, recalling the classic model of (self-organized) criticality, the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld sandpile model [11] . But what is it that causes such large avalanches?
The answer may lie in path interference, i.e., the overlapping of the active paths leading from two or more distinct inputs. In the three-layer minibrain, this is as simple as the strongest connections from two different inputs pointing to the same intermediary neuron. Broadly speaking, if the paths from two neurons overlap in this fashion, it is likely that (at least) one of the inputs is connected to the wrong output neuron; we can make this explicitly true if we require that the input-output map to be learned be one-to-one. The negative feedback, however, will affect both paths by removing the intermediary-output connection from the active level. Thus, a correct wiring of input to output can be destroyed by such interference.
A brief statistical analysis reveals the behaviour of this factor. Suppose we have an arbitrary minibrain network, Γ(η IP , η IM , η OP ). Labeling the input neurons by 0, 1, 2, . . . , η IP − 1, let us define, for a given input i, µ(i) to be the intermediary neuron led to by the strongest synaptic connection from i, and let p Γ i be the probability that at least two input neurons in the set {0, . . . , i} share the same value of µ. Thus, the probability of having path interference in the network is given by P Γ = p 
Now, substituting for η IM in terms of the control parameter η C , we have:
From which we can calculate,
Assuming large, fixed η IP and η OP , the higher-order terms in Equation (5) will vanish for η C > 1, and so P Γ will scale approximately according to a power law of η C , with exponent −1. Conversely, if η C < 1 then the higher-order terms are brought back into play and P Γ scales approximately exponentially; Fig. 5 shows nicely how the critical point η C = 1 acts as a transition point between these two scalings. Thus we can now explain why ρ increases so greatly for η C < 1: the excessive path interference makes it very different to hold on to correctly-matched input-output pairs. η C , strictly speaking a measure of the network connectivity, can be thought of as an indicator of clustering in the active level of the network, with either the cluster size or the number of clusters being scale-free at the critical point.
An analogy can be drawn with the well-known forest-fire model [7] , with the active level of synapses being represented by trees; a negative feedback signal can be thought of as starting a fire at the active synapse leading from the active input neuron. Path interference is then equivalent to tree clusters: if, for example, the active synaptic connections from two input neurons (A and B, say) lead to the same intermediary neuron P, then these connections can be thought of as trees adjacent to a third tree, representing the active connection leading from P to some output (X, say). Suppose we then send a negative feedback signal because X is the wrong output for input A. We can imagine, in the forest-fire model, setting a fire at tree AP, which will spread to the adjacent tree PX. But the fire will then continue to spread to tree BP. What has happened from the minibrain point of view is that the path BPX has been destroyed, and so when B is next stimulated it is very likely to produce a wrong output (almost certainly so if X was the correct output), and so the connection BP will be punished.
It should be noted that the analogy is not strictly accurate, since there are restrictions on synapses' membership of the active level-they must be the strongest connection leading from a neuron-that do not apply in the forestfire model: there are no extremal dynamics conditions that restrict whether or not a location can contain a tree. Nevertheless, the analogy is appealing enough to suggest that the forest-fire model might be useful in helping to gain further insight into the minibrain network. Bak [1] has also suggested a possible link between neural models and models of river networks [12] .
In essence, then, while the minibrain is only a very simple toy model that in no way captures the immense complexity of real biological neural systems, the results presented here and elsewhere [3] [4] [5] suggest a potential richness of behaviour that could match some of the classic models of critical systems.
Conclusions
One of Chialvo and Bak's hopes in developing the minibrain model [3, 4] was that it would be a self-organized critical (SOC) system, that is, one where a large enough network would display scale-free behaviour without any tuning of critical parameters required [1, 11, 13] . In that sense, the results of this paper might be seen as disappointing, because as Bak and Chialvo put it, 'We are allowed to play God, not man' [4] -that is, we can create the general network dynamics but cannot do any engineering or design of the internal structure 3 . The internal design of a neural system can come about only through biological evolution. The minibrain is of course only a toy model, but it is nevertheless worth asking the question: is there anything important about critical behaviour that might cause it to be favoured by natural selection? Indeed, the presence of scale-free behaviour in the context of the simple matching tasks we have demonstrated here may seem to be a disadvantage. For such simple tasks we want the system to learn quickly and efficiently without the risk of massive, system-reorganizing avalanches: the size of the intermediary layer should be as high as possible, higher than the critical point.
Where the criticality may become important, then, is in cases where there is more than one possible good output for given inputs. In this case the criticality, and the potentially system-wide changes that go with it, would become not a nuisance and a delaying mechanism but an exploration mechanism, a method of discovering new (and possibly better) solutions to given input, without necessarily having to wait until the old solution becomes 'wrong'. The minibrain model fundamentally follows the rule of the well-known saying, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it', abandoning a particular action only when it becomes unsatisfactory; the criticality, which means that a small change in input-output mapping can mean a big change in the topology of the active level, allows the minibrain to break free of this constraint from time to time, to (so to speak) change its point of view, to create new solutions to old problems. While much further research is needed on this topic, perhaps it is possible to suggest here that, for the (mini)brain, criticality = creativity?
